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STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated. 78-2(a)-2(e), 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
In this criminal case, the Court of Appeals has authority to 
decide the appeal based upon Utah Code Annotated, 78-2(a)-2(e), 
which grants to the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction in 
final orders involving criminal cases less than a First Degree 
Felony. Also see Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals concerning this Appeal in a criminal case. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendants were charged in separate Information in the 
Circuit Court in the State of Utah, Washington County St. George 
Department with three counts under the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act. The Defendant Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra was charged in 
Count One with possession of controlled Substances a Second Degree 
Felony in that he possessed cocaine and had previously convicted 
a prior offense. In Count Two he was charge with possession of 
marijuana a Class B Misdemeanor and in Count Three a possession of 
drug paraphernalia a Class Misdemeanor. The Defendant Kirk Dudley 
in a separate information was charged with the same charges but 
the First Count was a Third Degree Felony because there was no 
enhancemental alleged on the basis of a prior conviction. The 
Defendants filed a Notice of Hearing and the matter came for 
hearing on Wednesday, April 24, 1991, at the conclusion of the 
hearing the Court entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
which are attached here as the Exhibit One in the Appendix. 
After the denial the Motion to Suppress the Defendants entered into 
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a written agreement to change their plea while reserving the right 
to Appeal pursuant to the prior decision of this Court. That Plea 
Agreement was approved by the Court and the Defendant, Salvatore 
Calcaterra, plead guilty to the Third Degree Felony and the 
Defendant, Kirk Dudley, plead guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
After sentencing which took place on January 6, 1992, the Order was 
Stayed pending this Appeal and both Defendant's were released from 
custody. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the court err in denying the Motion to Suppress in 
light of th€» evidence at the hearing that the Defendants were 
detained after being issued a speeding citation? 
2. Did the ruling of the Court denying the Motion to 
Suppress deny each of the sentence their constitutional rights 
under the Utah State constitution and the Fourth and Fourteen 
Amendments to the United States Constitution? 
3. Did the Court err in requiring the Defendants to answer 
questions at the Motion to Suppress concerning their knowledge of 
the controlled substances even though the Defendant took the stand 
to testify concerning the factual issues on the Motion to 
Suppress. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Th€» Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that M[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, 
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houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated....11. 
2. Section Fourteen of Article I of the Utah State 
Constitution states as follows: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable search and seizures shall not be 
violated...." 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment in a criminal case which is 
was taken after the Defendants entered a conditional Appeal 
preserving their right to an Appeal while entering a no contest 
plea after the Motion to Suppress was granted by the Court. The 
Defendants filed a Motion pursuant to the case of State v. Sery, 
785 P. 2d 1935 ( Utah App. 1988) to allow the Defendants to each 
plea no contest and to approve the conditional plea permitting and 
reserving the suppression issue of an Appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. This Motion was made and approved by the Court. The 
Defendant Salvatore Calcaterra was sentenced on January 6, 1992, 
for a Third Degree Felony and the Defendant Kirk Dudley on January 
6, 1992, for a class A Misdemeanor. The sentence in both cases has 
been stayed pending this Appeal. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appeal was filed within thirty days from the date of the 
final order and this is the first appeal taken in this proceedings 
even though a prior appeal was dismissed due to the fact that the 
Notice of Appeal was filed between the date of Sentencing and the 
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date that the final judgment was entered necessitating the filing 
of the subsequent appeal. However there has been no prior appeals 
decisions by this Court be either of the Defendants. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Defendant, Salvatore Calcaterra, was sentenced to 0 to 5 
years in the State Prison and fined $5,000.00. That Sentence was 
stayed pending the serving 30 days jail and the payment of a fine 
of $1,150.00 as well as the usual conditions for probation. The 
Defendant, Kirk Dudley, was sentenced to 15 days in the Washington 
County Jail and fined $175.00 for the Class A Misdemeanor offense. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
WITH THE CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
The Defendants submits the follows facts were introduced as 
the hearing however, the Court entered separate Findings of Facts 
which are contained in Exhibit One to the appendix thereof 
submitted hereto. 
On December 9, 1990, the Defendant, Salvatore Anthony 
Calcaterra, was driving his white, 1985 Buick, four-door vehicle 
in which Kirk Dudley was the passenger and the vehicle was 
northbound on Interstate 15, south of St. George, approximately 
five miles from the Utah border, (Transcript 4/24/91 page 7) . 
Trooper James D. Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol was on 
traffic patrol and was traveling in a marked patrol vehicle 
southbound on Interstate 15. The Officer conducted a moving a 
radar check which indicated that Calcaterra vehicle was speeding 
at 78 miles per hour in a 60 mile per hour zone and he stopped the 
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vehicle at milepost 6 on Interstate 15, at approximately 4:45 p.m., 
near the Bloomington Exit. (Tr. 8) 
The trooper told Mr. Calcaterra that he had been stopped for 
speeding, advised the driver of the speed, and asked for his 
driver's license and vehicle registration. 
The highway patrol trooper took the information from the 
driver which was a drivers license and a temporary Colorado 
registration and returned to his vehicle to "issue him a citation 
and did come computer checks and things" (Tr. 9 Line 11) The 
Officer claimed that when he first approached the car he could 
smell a "strong perfume odor and I also could smell an intermittent 
odor of what smelled like marijuana to me". (Tr. 9) . In his patrol 
1 car, the officer filed out a uniform traffic citation for 
speeding and check with the El Paso Intelligence Center (E.P.I.C.) 
to check Mr. Calcaterra7s name before he returned to the vehicle 
in which Mr. Calcaterra was sitting. (Tr. 10) . When the officer 
returned to the vehicle after 10 minute without out a response from 
E.P.I.C, Mr. Salvatore Calcaterra signed the speeding ticket, and 
the officer gave Mr. Calcaterra the original speeding ticket as a 
citation for the offense of speeding. (Tr. 11) 
The highway patrol trooper continued to detain the vehicle and 
began interrogating the driver and asking questions concerning 
whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car. Mr. Calcaterra 
replied that he did not have any; and, the passenger was asked the 
same question by the officer and he gave the same response to the 
officer. (Tr. 13). 
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Trooper Lloyd asked the driver if he could check the trunk of 
the vehicle for drugs and Mr.Calcaterra said that he didn't have 
any. The Trooper asked again if he could look in the trunk and 
the driver said that he could. (Tr. 13). Mr. Calcaterra went to 
the trunk area of the car and opened the trunk. The officer 
searched the trunk and did not find any contraband. While 
searching he received information that his dispatch had 
information, and the officer returned to his vehicle and he claims 
he was told that Mr. Calcaterra has been previously arrested for 
transporting cocaine in the State of Louisiana (Tr. 14) . After 
finding nothing in the trunk, the officer asked if he could search 
the passenger compartment. At this time, the officer testified 
that Mr. Calcaterra "just pointed to the area like that 
(indicating) and shrugged his shoulders". (Tr. 17). Before 
commencing the search, Mr. Calcaterra was patted down and checked 
for weapons and ordered to step around to the front of the vehicle. 
(Tr. 19) . The passenger, Mr. Dudley, was also search for weapons 
and ordered out of the vehicle and required to stand and wait in 
front of the vehicle. The officer found a open container of alcohol 
under the passenger seat in a paper bag and in a trash receptacle 
in the front seat found a marijuana pipe and a small quality of 
marijuana. 
Both Mir. Dudley and Mr. Calcaterra were then according to the 
officer, handcuffed and told that they were under arrest and they 
were told that the officer was not sure what the charges would be 
at that time. (Tr. 23) . After another officer arrived, Trooper 
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Lloyd continued the search and found a black jacket in the back 
seat in which he found cocaine. The officer testified that the 
Defendant were detained and arrested at the scene for over an hour 
and his records reflected that the car was pulled overt at 4:45 
p.m. and the Defendants were booked into jail at 7:30 p.m. 
After the Defendants were taken from the scene, an inventory 
search was performed on the vehicle and no additional controlled 
substances were discovered. (Tr.26)-
The Defendant, Salvatore Calcaterra, testified that after 
waited up to a half an hour, the officer returned to his vehicle 
and handed him a citation for speeding and discussed the procedure 
to mail the ticket and gave him and mailing envelope. (Tr. 39) . 
He was then asked to step out of his vehicle and bring his keys in 
order that the officer could search his vehicle. (Tr. 40). 
While at the back of his vehicle, the officer received a 
message from dispatch for the offer to return to his car. (Tr.41) . 
Mr. Calcaterra testified that when he shrugged his shoulders, he 
said to the officer, "it seems like you're going to be doing 
whatever you like anyway" (Tr. 42). 
The passenger in the vehicle, Kirk Dudley, took the stand and 
testified that the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra to get out of the 
car and bring the keys to search the truck after he had given Mr. 
Calcaterra, the speeding ticker. (Tr. 49) . He testified, that 
both Defendant's were handcuffed, while standing in front of the 
vehicle prior to the officer searching the interior of the vehicle 
and finding the controlled substances. (Tr. 50). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In summary, the Defendants each submit that the Utah State 
Highway Patrol Trooper violated the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
when he continued to detain the Defendants and handcuff the 
Defendants after the probable cause for the traffic stop had 
terminated. The conclusive factor in this case is based upon the 
undisputed evidenced that the Defendants received a speeding 
citation which was issued by the Patrol Trooper. The officer 
thereafter did not obtain consent and required the driver to open 
the trunk. The Defendant submit that the trial court did not apply 
the laws as clearly set forth in prior decisions of this Court. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DETENTION AFTER THE CITATION WAS 
ISSUED WAS ILLEGAL. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that ff[t]he right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated 
Consistent therewith, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each of which 
requires a different degree of justification to be 
constitutionally permissible: 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
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the person has committed or is about to commit 
a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop;" 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also, State v. Steward. 153 
Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1991). 
The Defendant Appellants maintain that because of the 
similarity of fact pattern, the analysis of this case should be the 
same as in State v. Robinsonf 797 P.2d 431 (APP. 1990). In 
Robinson, a Utah highway patrol trooper pulled over the Defendant 
on the Interstate Highway near the Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
highway patrol trooper asked for the driver's license and vehicle 
registration and at that time the trooper became suspicious because 
the person appeared nervous during the time he was searching for 
the registration. After determining the van was not stolen, the 
highway patrol trooper wrote out a warning citation to the driver, 
or a traffic violation, and handed it to the driver. 
Even though the driver had been given a citation, the troopers 
continued to detain the vehicle based upon what they had observed 
because the troopers were determined to ask for consent to search 
the vehicle. The officers returned the van, and asked if they were 
carrying any weapons, money, or narcotics, and were told "no". At 
that point in time, they also asked if a search could be made of 
the vehicles, and according to the troopers, the driver verbally 
agreed to the request. Thereafter, the doors to the van were open 
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and there was a substantial amount of marijuana was found hidden 
under a bed compartment in the back of the van. 
The Utah Court of Appeals cited as authority United State v. 
B. Guzman, 864 F.2d. 1512 (10th Cir. 1988) where, the Tenth Court 
of Appeals had ruled that once a driver has produced a valid 
license and evidence of entitlement to use of the vehicle, the 
driver must be allowed to proceed without being subject to further 
delay by the police for additional questioning. Any further 
temporary detention for investigation, questioning after 
fulfillment for the purpose of the initial stop was said to be 
justified only if the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion 
of serious criminal activity. The Court found in light of the 
Defendant's unlawful detention after that point a violation of 
their Fourth Amendment Rights. 
Another reversal took place concerning a highway patrol 
traffic stop in the case of State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep.8 (Ct. 
of App. 1991). In Sims, Utah Highway Patrol Officers conducted a 
roadblock. The Court cited the case State v. Larocco, 794 P.2nd 
460 (Utah 1990) indicated that warrantless searches of automobiles 
are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action 
before a warrant can be obtained. 
In State v. Johnson, 153 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) , the Supreme Court 
suppressed a search of a backpack of a passenger in a vehicle 
stopped for a license plate and registration check of the driver. 
The Court found that a seizure occurred when the officer took the 
defendants name and expected her to wait while he ran a warrant's 
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check. The Supreme Court stated that "the leap from asking for the 
passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check on 
her severed the chain of rational inference from specific 
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as 
yet "inchoate and unparticularized hunch'" citing Terry v. Ohio. 
392 U.S. 27 (1968) The Supreme Court held that the officer's 
detention of the passenger went beyond what was reasonably related 
in scope to the traffic stop violating the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
The recent decision of State v. Parker 189 U.A.R. 3 (Ct. App. 
1992) (No. 910265) sets forth standards applicable in determining 
the legality of the scope and duration of the stop. In that case, 
the Court of Appeals states that Utah cases establish the length 
nd scope of traffic stops must be strictly tried to and justified 
by the circumstances which rendered the initiation permissible 
citing State v. Johnson. 805 p. 2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
The County indicated that once the initial reasons for the 
stop has been completed, the occupants must be allowed to proceed 
without any further detention unless the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity. 
In Parker. the driver was stopped for speeding and illegally 
detained and arrested the Defendant acted outside the "realm of 
discretion granted to the police officers under the law." State 
v. Parker. 189 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (1992) at page 5. 
The defendant respectfully submits that the officer in this 
case detained the defendant on a "hunch" that the defendant may 
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have had possession of controlled substance. It is undisputed that 
the initial stop was a traffic stop and the basis for the stop 
limited the reasonable amount of time for the detention to the 
point the citation was issued. The officer instead continued to 
detain and required occupants of the vehicle pulled over for 
speeding to exit the vehicle to submit to a pat down search, then 
to stand in front of their care while a traffic patrol officer 
investigates the possibility of drug possession. 
This is not a case where the driver extended the encounter 
after citation was issued. State v. Castner 825 P. 2d 699 (Ct. 
App. Utah 1992). The driver was intentionally detained without 
other evidence of reasonable cause. C.F. State v. Grovier 808 P. 
2d 133 (Ct. App 1991). 
The evidence contained in the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing indicated the following technique was used in this case 
while the Defendant's were detained after receiving the speeding 
ticket to convenience the Defendant's that he was going to search 
with or without their consent: 
1) The officer asked if Mr. Calcaterra has any weapons or 
any drugs. (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing page 9). 
2) The officer then bent down and asked the passenger, Mr. 
Dudley, if "he had used drugs" and he responded that "he 
didn't" (Tr. P.H. page 9). 
3) The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra if he could check the 
vehicle for drugs and Mr. Calcaterra said "he didn't have 
any." (Tr. P.H. 101). 
4) The officer then asked to look in the trunk and the trunk 
wets searched after Mr. Calcaterra was told to take his 
keys to the rear of the vehicle. (Tr. 4/24/91 page 41) . 
12 
5) The officer asked if he could search the passenger 
compartment and Mr. Calcaterra responded that "he didn't 
have any drugs," (Tr. 11). 
6) The officers asked again and Mr. Calcaterra "shrugged" 
in the direction of the car. (Tr. 13). 
7) Both person were patted down and ordered to stand on the 
highway in front of the vehicle and were handcuffed 
according to Both Defendant's (Tr* 15 ). 
The result of this procedure was the driver indicating that 
the officer should go ahead and search because "it seems like 
you're going to be dong whatever you like anyway." (Tr. 4/24/91 
page 42). The officer did not have a basis to arrest and did not 
have a legal reason to detain and communicate his insistence and 
determination to search irrespective lack of consent of the 
Defendant. 
The possible of "burnt" marijuana did not justify the unlawful 
detaining of the appellants. The unsubstantiated information from 
"E.P.I.C. of an alleged drug trafficking conviction is not curative 
of burnt marijuana smell which is indicative of possible use of 
controlled substance. The officer did not investigate impairment 
or driving under the influence. The officer was acting on an hunch 
based on a profile and was unlawfully detained both Appellants in 
order to act on his hunch. The detention was unconstitutional and 
requires reversal of the conviction. 
II. 
THE ILLEGAL SEARCH CANNOT BE 
VALIDATED BY THE ALLEGED CONSENT 
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (CT. APP. 1990), after 
finding the illegal detention, the Court went on to find that the 
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warrantless search of the van was not validly consented to by the 
driver. The Court stated two factors to determine whether consent 
to a search is lawfully obtained following police action must be 
analyzed: First, the consent must be voluntary in fact, and 
second, the consent must be not be obtained by police exploitation 
of the prior illegality, citing the case of State v. Arrovo, 137 
Utah, ADV. REP.13 (1990). The Court indicated that the Defendants 
were first questioned during the brief initially valid traffic 
stop, and that once the legal basis for that stop had ended, they 
were not free to leave. The Court indicated that there was no 
evidence that the driver was aware ©r was informed that he did not 
have to accede to the troopers request, and at the time it was 
apparent that the Defendants would be kept in custody environment 
until the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the contents of 
the van. The Court went on to conclude that the State, from those 
facts, had not born its burden of proving that the consent to 
search the vehicle was voluntary, and that the State also failed 
to establish that the consent was free from coercion. 
In the case of State v. Harqraves, 153 Utah. Adv. Rep.33 (Ct. 
App. 1991) the Court reaffirmed the importance of the 
determination concerning the basis and legality of a detention. 
In that case, the Court indicated that the trial court in 
considering a Motion to Suppress should apply an objective 
standard determining what a reasonable person in the circumstances 
of the driver would have believed at that time. If the Court 
finds that the Defendant was in custody throughout the incident, 
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the Court must determine whether the custody was lawful in its 
scope and duration citing again the case of United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1980). The Court indicated that 
if the custody was unlawful the Court must determine whether the 
consent to search was obtained by exploitation of that prior 
illegality. 
The officer in this case has admitted that the defendant's 
were not free to leave. The alleged consent would not have been 
obtained but for the officers repeated interrogation and questions 
to the defendants about controlled substance. Under this fact 
situation, the State cannot prove the "consent" to search was 
voluntary. 
III. 
THE SEARCH CANNOT BE VALIDATED BY 
THE NONVERBAL ALLEGED » CONSENT" OF 
THE DEFENDANT. 
In State v. Carter. 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), the Court 
stated that: 
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive issue to be 
determined by examining the totality of the circumstance. See 
Marshall. 791 P.2d at 887; Webb 790 P.2d at 82 (citing United 
States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980)). This includes 
the specific characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
police conduct involved. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 689. 
In Carter, the court set forth the standard previously 
adopted by the tenth circuit for determining whether the 
government had sustained its burden of proving voluntary consent. 
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(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived, 
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 
885 (10th Cir. 1977)); Webb. 790 P.2d at 82. 
The Utah Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to what 
factors may indicate a lack of coercion, including: "1) absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to 
search; 4) cooperation by the owner.*.; and 5) the absence of 
deception or trick on the part of the officer." State v* 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
The scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of the 
actual consent itself. State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) • The Defendant in this case indicated that a search 
could be made of the trunk, not the passenger compartment and items 
of personal property located in the passenger compartment. 
Even without "every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver" of the continued unjustified detention and warrant 
requirement, the defendants "shrugging of his shoulders" does not 
constitute "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given" consent to search the passenger compartment while being 
required to stand in front of the vehicle in the highway. The 
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shoulder shrug was not clear and passive waiver of constitutional 
rights and was a product of unlawful detention. 
The Court in upholding the search as follows: 
Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulder, with a motion which the 
officer indicated on the witness stand. 
The officer took that to be consent and proceeded to search 
the vehicle. 
Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the vehicle at 
that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle. (See 
Findings set forth in Exhibit One, Appendix). 
The Court shifted the presumption against waiver by allowing 
the officer to take the aiabiguous gesture as consent to search and 
consent to order the Defendant's out of an to the front of the 
vehicle. He then required the driver to obiect to the orders of 
the officer and communication an objection to the insistent and 
demanding officer. 
This ruling is inconsistent with the facts and ignores the 
clear rulings of the Court. If the presumption against waiver was 
correctly applied, the Motion to Suppress would have been granted. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The State had the burden of establishing that there was a 
basis for the warrantless search of the vehicle and burden of 
establishing a clear and unequivocal consent and waiver by the 
defendants. The defendant's respectfully submit that the evidence 
or findings does not support such legal conclusion that the search 
was a property search. 
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The trial court erroneously characterized this dentition as 
a "Level II Stop". However, the officer did not have probable 
cause to arrest and was not justified in interrogating and holding 
the Defendant's until the Defendant made an ambiguous gesture in 
order to allow the officer to claim consent• 
The lower court order denying the Motion to Suppress should 
be reversed and the case remanded, 
V. 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit Number 1 - Findings of Fact, entered by trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1992. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and a true 
and correct copy to the Washington County Attorney's Office, 37 
East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, by depositing the same 
in the U.S. Mail. 
DATED this day of August, 1992. 
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Paul F. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR'THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF T,TAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. ; 
SALVATORE ANTHONY CALCATERRA, ] 
KIRK DUDLEY, ] 
DEFENDANT. ; 
) FINDINGS OF 
CONCLUSIONS 
CRIMINAL NO. 
) CRIMINAL NO. 
FACT AN 
OF LAW 
91150r 
91150" 
The above-entitled matters having been con^olida4; - -1 for 
hearing on the Defendants for Motion to Suppress before the above-
entitled Court on the 24th day of April, 1991, and the State of 
Utah being represented by O. Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County 
Attorney, and Randall T. Gaither, attorney for the Defendants being 
present, and the Defendants, Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra and Kirk 
Dudley, being present, and the Court having received *"??timony and 
exhibits in evidence, the Court having reviewed the f'les and 
records herein and being fully advised in the premise^, now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant, Salvatore 
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Calcaterra was driving his vehicle, and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a 
passenger, northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the Utah 
border. 
2. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd stopped the 
vehicle at about mile post six, after determining the Calcaterra 
vehicle was traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone where that 
was excessive speed. 
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to Mr. calcaterra for 
the speeding violation. 
4. That during the process of the filling out of the citation 
in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd requested information frc™ EPIC — El 
Paso Information Center -- for the reason that he had smelled 
marijuana in the vehicle as he was speaking to the driver at the 
side of the vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation. 
5. That the officer did detect the odors of marijuana. 
6. The officer went back to the vehicle, issued the citation 
to Mr. Calcaterra, handed him the citation and his driver's 
license. 
7. That it was a normal traffic violation, with the addition 
of an odor of marijuana. 
8. That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra whether or not he 
had drugs, weapons or alcohol in the vehicle. 
9. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not. 
10. The officer asked if he could search the trunk of the 
vehicle. 
11. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not carrying anything. 
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12. The officer asked again if he could search the trunk of 
the vehicle. 
13. Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went around and opened 
he trunk of the vehicle and allowed the officer to search. 
14. While he was engaged in the search of the trunk, the 
officer received a response from the dispatcher in Cedar City to 
his inquiry of EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a previous 
history of involvement in drugs offenses. 
15. The officer returned to the vehicle and continued the 
search of the trunk and found nothing of note in-the trunk. 
16. The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about the information 
that he'd received from the dispatcher relating to an alleged 
conviction involving the transportation of drugs. 
17. Mr. Calcaterra explained tc the officer as he understood 
it, that he had been arrested, but the charges had been dismissed. 
18. The officer then asked if he could search the interior of 
the vehicle. 
19. Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not carrying any of 
the things that the officer was looking for. 
20. The officer then inquired a second time whether he could 
search the interior of the vehicle by saying "May I search the 
interior of the vehicle, then?" 
21. Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders, with a motion 
which the officer indicated on the witness stand, 
22. The officer took that to bo consent and proceeded to 
search the vehicle. 
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23. Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the 
vehicle at that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle. 
24. The officer, in searching the vehicle, determined that 
there was a small quantity of marijuana and what appeared to be a 
marijuana pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the console 
portion of the vehicle. 
25. When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the drug had been 
found, he approached the officer and asked for a break. 
26. The officer then handcuffed Mr. Calcaterra and placed him 
under arrest. 
27. Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and handcuffed when the 
second officer arrived. 
28. The officers then proceeded to complete the search of the 
vehicle and discovered other items of contraband while the 
defendants were standing by handcuffed and under arrest. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the decision of the officer to investigate the smell 
of marijuana was a level two detention, and the officer did have an 
articulable suspicion, based upon the smell of burned marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle. 
2. That the Court finds that there was consent to search the 
vehicle, and the officer was reasonable, under all the 
circumstances, in believing he had consent to search the trunk of 
the vehicle. 
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3. That the Court finds that the consent to search the trunk 
was voluntarily given• 
4. That the Court also finds that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the later shrugging of the shoulders was intended as 
consent to search the interior of Mr.Calcaterras vehicle, and the 
officer was justified in arriving at that conclusion. 
5. That the Court finds that the actions of the officer were 
reasonable, and the search was reasonable. 
6. That there is no reason to suppress the evidence, and the 
motion to suppress should be denied. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
J. PHILIP EVES 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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